This study contributes to the literature on corporate real estate sales by examining the financing hypothesis of Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995) . We exploit the concept that institutional investor involvement and debt obligations lead to effective monitoring of managers, compelling them to take value-maximizing decisions and thus reducing the degree of agency costs of managerial discretion. We show that the stock market responds more favorably to arm's-length corporate real estate sales by low agency-cost firm-years than those by high agency-cost firm-years. The result supports the financing hypothesis that implies a negative relation between stock market responses to asset sales and degrees of agency costs.
I. Introduction
Asset sales are common corporate activity. How do these transactions affect shareholder wealth? Hite, Owers, and Rogers (1987, HOR hereafter) provide empirical evidence that, on average, asset sales lead to significant share price increases for selling firms. Interpreted by HOR (1987), the positive price reactions are because selling firms capture some of the gains from allocating assets to higher-valued uses. In addition to supporting HOR's (1987) efficiency deployment hypothesis, John and Ofek (1995) also find evidence consistent with their own improving focus hypothesis. In their study, the announcement stock returns are greater for the sellers that increase focus in their business than others. In other words, asset sales eliminate negative synergies between the sold asset and the remaining assets, thus increase share prices.
Both the efficient deployment hypothesis and the improving focus hypothesis imply that shareholders benefit from asset sales equally whether management re-invests or pays out the sale proceeds. Implicitly the two hypotheses assume that management maximizes shareholder wealth. 1, 2 In the contrary, Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995, LPS hereafter) advance and present empirical support for their financing explanation of asset sales that arising from management self-interest point of view. Valuing firm size and control, management sells corporate assets to pursue its own objectives that may increase or decrease shareholder wealth. Thus the firms, where agency costs of managerial discretion are important, experience more favorable share price reactions when paying out the proceeds than otherwise. In addition, consistent with the financing hypothesis, LPS (1995) show that the payout decision of sale proceeds is positively correlated with the managerial ownership or investment opportunities of the selling firms. Bates (2002) confirms the correlations. Nevertheless, LPS (1995) do not find a direct link between stock-price reactions and proxies for agency costs of managerial discretion.
On the other hand, Hirschey, Slovin, and Zaima (1990, HSZ hereafter) have evidence that higher stock returns in responses to general corporate divestments made by U.S. firms are associated with higher levels of bank debt. Lasfer, Sundarsanam, and Taffler (1996, LST hereafter) have the similar finding for market responses to general corporate sell-offs and levels of debt financing in U.K. The two studies both show that efficient monitoring is positively associated with market responses to asset sales and thus, provide more direct evidence linking stock-price reactions and agency costs of managerial discretion.
The studies of general asset sales have been extended to focus on corporate real estate transactions. Examples are Glascock, Davidson, and Sirmans (1991; GDS hereafter), Booth, Gloscock, and Sarkar (1996; BGS hereafter), and Liao and Chang (1996) . However the studies
have not yet examined LPS's (1995) financing hypothesis. This study contributes to the literature on corporate real estate sales by examining the financing hypothesis. Specifically we examine the link between stock-price reactions and agency costs of managerial discretion in the context of corporate real estate transactions.
Stratifying observations into "high agency-cost firm-years" and "low agency-cost firmyears" with monitoring devices, this study presents evidence that abnormal returns are higher for low agency-cost firm-years than for high agency-cost firm-years in corporate real estate sales.
This empirical result supports the financing hypothesis that agency costs of managerial discretion matter in corporate real estate transactions. 4 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the empirical methods.
Section III describes the data. Section IV presents empirical results. The final section offers some concluding remarks.
II. Empirical Methods
To examine whether low agency-cost firm-years have higher abnormal returns than high agency-cost firm-years in real estate sales, we use the market model as the returns generating process 3 :
where it R is the return on security i on day , t mt R is the return on the market index, Taiwan
Stock Exchange Capitalization Weighted Stock Index (TAIEX), on day , t and it ε is a random error term. For each security, the market model is computed over days -120 to -31 relative to the event date of the sale. The 90-day period conforms to the studies on asset sales of Lin and Shen (1996) in Taiwan. We define the dates when transaction contracts are signed as the event dates.
Abnormal returns for security i on day t are calculated as:
where the coefficients ˆi α and ˆi β are ordinary least square estimates of the market model parameters for security . i Abnormal returns are then summed up over the period from day 1 T to
T T < ) to obtain individual cumulative abnormal return defined as:
The cumulative average abnormal returns over a sample of N securities from day 1 T to day 2 T is:
The variance of 1 2 ( , ) CAR T T is defined as:
Day 1 T to day 2 T is evaluated over the interval from day -4 to day +2 relative to the event date.
The interval coincides with the market response pattern for real estate sales documented by Liao and Chang (1996). 4 The effect of asset sales on shareholder returns are tested for its significance using the tstatistics defined as: We group the firm-years with both institutional ownership and book debt-to-asset ratios below their individual 50 percentiles into the "high agency-cost" group and the other firm-years into the "low agency-cost" group. 5 We test the difference in cumulative average abnormal returns between the high agency cost firm-years, , H CAR and the low agency-cot firm-years, , L CAR with the statistics defined as:
where ( ) Equation (8) (1996) indicate that the market condition may affect market reactions to real estate transactions.
We include i MRD in equation (8) to consider this potential effect. Following Liao and Chang (1996), we classify our study period into bull markets and bear market by the overall trend of TAIEX. As expected, the Asia financial crisis period is classified as a bear market.
III. The Data
We initially purchase custom-built data of fixed-asset sales of non-financial firms occurred during March 7, 1994 the mean selling price of real estate is NT$ 653 million (median NT$ 267). 8 The mean profit, the difference between the selling price and the appraised value, from the real estate sales is NT$ 18 million (median NT$ 6 million). The mean ratio of selling price over the market capitalization of the selling firm is 19.526% (median 4.409%) and the mean ratio of profit over the market capitalization of the selling firm is 0.166% (median 0.036%).
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IV. Empirical Results
The section presents our empirical results. Table 2 summarizes the CARs for the full sample, and separately for the two "high agency-cost" and "low agency-cost" subsamples. The full sample has a significant CAR of 2.368%. The evidence confirms the general outcome of the existing studies that sellers achieve positive unexpected returns at real estate transactions. That is, this result supports the research of GDS (1991), BGS (1996), and Liao and Chang (1996) .
The results of the subsamples are consistent with the financing hypothesis that implies a negative relation between stock price effects and degrees of agency costs in asset sales.
Specifically the high agency-cost subsample experiences no significant unexpected returns in their real estate sales. The CAR for this subsample is -0.350%. On the other hand, the low agency-cost subsample achieves significant positive unexpected returns. This subsample experiences a CAR of 3.319%. As expected, the difference in the CARs between the two subsamples is statistically significant. The overall results of the subsamples suggest that the positive unexpected returns experienced by real estate sellers are driven by the low agency cost subsample. Table 3 reports the coefficient estimates for the regression model of Equation (8). Same to Table 2, Table 3 insignificance is not surprising. Different from Liao and Chang (1996) , we find no evidence that the stock market responds more favorably to real estate sales in bull markets than in bear markets.
It is likely because Liao and Chang (1996) do not consider the other factors we consider in this study.
V. Conclusion
The financing hypothesis of LPS (1995) implies a negative relation between stock market responses to asset sales and degrees of agency costs. Interestingly LPS (1995) do not find a direct link between stock-price reactions and proxies for agency costs of managerial discretion.
Although HSZ (1990) and LST (1996) show such a link in not-real-estate sales, the existing studies on corporate real estate sales has not yet examined LPS's (1995) financing hypothesis.
Supporting LPS's (1995) hypothesis, our study provides new evidence that agency-costs of managerial discretion matter in market responses to asset sales in the context of corporate real estate transactions. Thus this study not only adds to the literature on corporate sell-offs but also contributes to those on corporate real estate sales. We explore the influence of monitoring mechanism on market responses to arm's-length sales of corporate real estate. Consistent with the concept that institutional investor involvement and debt obligations lead to effective monitoring of managers, compelling them to take value-maximizing decisions and thus reducing the degree of agency costs of managerial discretion, our evidence shows that abnormal returns are higher for low agency-cost firm-years than for high agency-cost firm-years in corporate real estate sales.
Endnotes
1 Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995) explicitly point out the shareholder wealth maximization assumption in the efficient deployment hypothesis. 2 The information hypothesis is another explanation that implies management sells corporate assets to maximize shareholder wealth. Hite, Owers and Rogers (1987) examine and reject this hypothesis in the U.S. context. In addition the information hypothesis should be less applicable in the countries where asset revaluation is permitted such as Taiwan. 3 Booth, Glascock, and Sarkar (1996) use a market model that permits unexpected returns to follow a generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic (GARH) process in their study on corporate sell-offs of real estate assets in US. Lin and Shen (1996) also use a market model with a GARCH process in studying general asset selloffs in Taiwan. Both of the studies conclude that the traditional OLS approach provides overall economic results essentially identical to the GARCH model. 4 The length of the event interval may reflect the nature of real estate transactions and the price change limits set in the Taiwan stock market. Firms in a real estate transaction usually undergo a period of negotiation and need to seek advices from real estate appraisal firms before signing a transaction contract. Therefore the market may know the information before the contract dates. 5 The two monitoring devices certainly are not all monitoring devices and the grouping rule may not be the best.
Thus our grouping may blur the distinction between actual high-agency firms and actual low-agency firms. i RG is the relative divestment profit represented by the ratio of the real-estate-sale profit (the difference between the selling price and the appraised value) to firm i 's equity market value at the 5 days immediately prior to the event date. 
